Cryptanalysis of PASS II and MiniPass


Goi, , BM and Siddiqi,, MU and Ding, , JT (2005) Cryptanalysis of PASS II and MiniPass. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, PROCEEDINGS, 3783 . pp. 159-168. ISSN 0302-9743

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In ACISP '00, Wu et al. proposed attacks to break the Polynomial Authentication and Signature Scheme (PASS), in particular, they are able to generate valid authentication transcripts and digital signatures without knowing the private key and any previous transcripts/signatures. They showed that PASS can be broken with around 2(38.3) trials. In this paper, we analyze the security of the improved versions of PASS; viz. PASS II and MiniPASS, and extend the Wu et al.'s attacks to PASS II and MiniPASS to break them. Furthermore, we discuss why and how these schemes are broken from the view point of the structure of cryptosystems and point out the fundamental weakness behind.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA71-90 Instruments and machines > QA75.5-76.95 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions: Faculty of Engineering (FOE)
Depositing User: Ms Rosnani Abd Wahab
Date Deposited: 23 Aug 2011 02:31
Last Modified: 23 Aug 2011 02:31


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