On the security bounds of CMC, EME, EME(+) and EME* - Modes of operation


Phan, , RCW and Goi, , BM (2005) On the security bounds of CMC, EME, EME(+) and EME* - Modes of operation. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, PROCEEDINGS , 3783 . pp. 136-146. ISSN 0302-9743

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Since 2002, variants of two tweakable block cipher modes of operation, CMC and EME, have been presented by Halevi and Rogaway that are suitable for encryption of disk sectors. In this paper, we show that the security bounds given in their proofs are tight, and hence complement the security proofs of the designers. In particular, we show how to distinguish the CMC, EME, EME(+) and EME* modes from random tweakable permutations with negligible effort and 2(n/2) chosen plaintexts, where n is the block size in bits. Further, we point out that both modes leak secret information via side-channel attacks (timing and power) due to the data-dependent internal multiplication operation.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA71-90 Instruments and machines > QA75.5-76.95 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions: Faculty of Computing and Informatics (FCI)
Depositing User: Ms Rosnani Abd Wahab
Date Deposited: 23 Aug 2011 05:33
Last Modified: 23 Aug 2011 05:33
URII: http://shdl.mmu.edu.my/id/eprint/2351


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