Cryptanalysis of the n-party encrypted Diffie-Hellman key exchange using different passwords

Phan, Raphael Chung Wei and Goi, Bok Min (2006) Cryptanalysis of the n-party encrypted Diffie-Hellman key exchange using different passwords. In: Applied Cryptography and Network Security. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (3989). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 226-238. ISBN 978-3-540-34704-0

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Abstract

We consider the security of the n-party EKE-U and EKEM protocols proposed by Byun and Lee at ACNS '05. We show that EKE-U is vulnerable to an impersonation attack, offline dictionary attack and undetectable online dictionary attack. Surprisingly, even the strengthened variant recently proposed by the same designers to counter an insider offline dictionary attack by Tang and Chen, is equally vulnerable. We also show that both the original and strengthened EKE-M variants do not provide key privacy, a criterion desired by truly contributory key exchange schemes and recently formalized by Abdalla et al. We discuss ways to protect EKE-U against our attacks and argue that the strengthened EKE-U scheme shows the most potential as a provably secure n-party PAKE.

Item Type: Book Section
Additional Information: Book Subtitle: 4th International Conference, ACNS 2006, Singapore, June 6-9, 2006. Proceedings
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75.5-76.95 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions: Faculty of Engineering (FOE)
Depositing User: Ms Rosnani Abd Wahab
Date Deposited: 10 Aug 2011 07:03
Last Modified: 03 Mar 2015 08:13
URI: http://shdl.mmu.edu.my/id/eprint/2022

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