The security of the FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme


Ogata, Wakaha and Kurosawa, Kaoru and Heng, Swee Huay (2006) The security of the FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 52 (5). pp. 2006-2017. ISSN 0018-9448

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In this paper, a new kind of adversarial goal called forge-and-impersonate in undeniable signature schemes is introduced. Note that forgeability does not necessarily imply impersonation ability. The security of the full-domain hash (FDH) variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme is then classified according to three dimensions, the goal of adversaries, the attacks, and the zero-knowledg (ZK) level of confirmation and disavowal protocols. Each security is then related to some well-known computational problem. In particular, the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme with noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) protocol confirmation and disavowal protocols is proven to be equivalent to the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, as opposed to the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem as claimed by Okamoto and Pointcheval.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Invisibility, security analysis, undeniable signature, unforgeability, zero knowledge (ZK)
Subjects: Q Science > QC Physics > QC350-467 Optics. Light
Divisions: Faculty of Information Science and Technology (FIST)
Depositing User: Ms Rosnani Abd Wahab
Date Deposited: 23 Sep 2011 03:03
Last Modified: 14 Dec 2020 08:15


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