The security of the FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme

Ogata, W. and Kurosawa, K. and Swee, Huay Heng (2006) The security of the FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 52 (5). pp. 2006-2017. ISSN 0018-9448

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2006.872853

Abstract

In this paper, a new kind of adversarial goal called forge-and-impersonate in undeniable signature schemes is introduced. Note that forgeability does not necessarily imply impersonation ability. The security of the full-domain hash (FDH) variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme is then classified according to three dimensions, the goal of adversaries, the attacks, and the zero-knowledg (ZK) level of confirmation and disavowal protocols. Each security is then related to some well-known computational problem. In particular, the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme with noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) protocol confirmation and disavowal protocols is proven to be equivalent to the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, as opposed to the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem as claimed by Okamoto and Pointcheval.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75.5-76.95 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions: Faculty of Information Science and Technology (FIST)
Depositing User: Ms Rosnani Abd Wahab
Date Deposited: 23 Sep 2011 03:03
Last Modified: 23 Sep 2011 03:03
URI: http://shdl.mmu.edu.my/id/eprint/1973

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