Verifying MQV-Based Protocols Using ProVerif


Yap, Ernest YongYi and Chin, Ji Jian and Goh, Alwyn (2021) Verifying MQV-Based Protocols Using ProVerif. In: 9th International Conference on IT Convergence and Security, ICITCS 2021, 15-17 May 2021, Virtual Conference.

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ProVerif is an automatic protocol verifier that is usually used to find symbolic attacks in a protocol as described in the Dolev-Yao Security Model [7]. But according to its manual [2], it can also be used to verify some computation attacks such as those described in the Bellare-Rogaway (BR) or Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) Security Model [5]. This cryptographic tool does not recognize the laws of mathematics and the laws needed to be applied manually. This paper shows the security verification of authenticated MQV-based key exchange (AKE) protocols. We show the proof of correctness using this protocol verifier tool as well as some of the known computational attacks done by others such as Unknown-Key-Share attack using it. Included in our results are two MQV-based protocol variants: an identity based key agreement (FG IB-KA) and a certificateless identity authenticated based key agreement (CLAKA).

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Computer network protocols, ProVerif, Protocol, MQV, IBKA
Subjects: T Technology > TK Electrical engineering. Electronics Nuclear engineering > TK5101-6720 Telecommunication. Including telegraphy, telephone, radio, radar, television
Divisions: Faculty of Engineering (FOE)
Depositing User: Ms Nurul Iqtiani Ahmad
Date Deposited: 04 Nov 2021 04:10
Last Modified: 04 Nov 2021 04:10


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