The security of the FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme

Ogata, , WH and Heng, , SH and Kurosawa,, KR (2005) The security of the FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme. PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY - PKC 2005 , 3386 . pp. 328-345. ISSN 0302-9743

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

In this paper, we first introduce a new kind of adversarial goal called forge-and-impersonate in undeniable signature schemes. Note that forgeability does not,necessarily imply impersonation ability. We then the security of them FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme according to three dimensions, the goal of adversaries; the attacks and the ZK level of confirmation and disavowal protocols. We finally relate each security to some well-known computational problem. In particular, we prove that the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme with NIZK confirmation and disavowal protocols is equivalent to the CDH problem, as opposed to the GDH problem as claimed by Okamoto and Pointcheval.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75.5-76.95 Electronic computers. Computer science
Depositing User: Ms Rosnani Abd Wahab
Date Deposited: 24 Aug 2011 05:07
Last Modified: 24 Aug 2011 05:07
URI: http://shdl.mmu.edu.my/id/eprint/2310

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item